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A Classification of Unimodular Lattice Wiretap
Codes in Small Dimensions
Fuchun Lin and Fre´de´rique Oggier
Abstract—Lattice coding over a Gaussian wiretap channel,
where an eavesdropper listens to transmissions between a trans-
mitter and a legitimate receiver, is considered. A new lattice
invariant called the secrecy gain [1] is used as a code design
criterion for wiretap lattice codes since it was shown to char-
acterize the confusion that a chosen lattice can cause at the
eavesdropper: the higher the secrecy gain of the lattice, the
more confusion. In this paper, a formula for the secrecy gain
of unimodular lattices is derived. Secrecy gains of extremal odd
unimodular lattices as well as unimodular lattices in dimension
n, 16 ≤ n ≤ 23 are computed, covering the 4 extremal odd
unimodular lattices and all the 111 non-extremal unimodular
lattices (both odd and even) providing thus a classification of
the best wiretap lattice codes coming from unimodular lattices
in dimension n, 8 < n ≤ 23. Finally, to permit lattice encoding
via Construction A, the corresponding error correction codes are
determined.
Index Terms—Gaussian channel, Lattice codes, Secrecy gain,
Theta series, Wiretap codes, Unimodular lattices.
I. INTRODUCTION
In his seminal work, Wyner [2] introduced the wiretap
channel, a discrete memoryless channel where the sender
Alice transmits confidential messages to a legitimate receiver
Bob, in the presence of an eavesdropper Eve. Both reliable
and confidential communication between Alice and Bob is
shown to be achievable at the same time, by exploiting the
physical difference between the channel to Bob and that to
Eve, without the use of cryptographic means. Many results
of information theoretical nature are available in the literature
for various classes of channels ranging from Gaussian point-
to-point channels to relay networks (see e.g. [3] for a survey)
capturing the trade-off between reliability and secrecy and
aiming at determining the highest information rate that can be
achieved with perfect secrecy, the so-called secrecy capacity.
Coding results focusing on constructing concrete codes that
can be implemented in a specific channel are much fewer (see
[4], [5] for examples of wiretap codes dealing with channels
with erasures).
In this paper, we will focus on Gaussian wiretap channels,
whose secrecy capacity was established in [6]. Examples of
existing Gaussian wiretap codes were designed for binary
inputs, as in [7], [8]. A different approach was adopted in [1],
where lattice codes were proposed, using as design criterion a
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new lattice invariant called secrecy gain, which was shown to
characterize the confusion at the eavesdropper. This suggests
the study of the secrecy gain of lattices as a way to understand
how to design a good Gaussian wiretap code. Unimodular
lattices were shown to be good candidates in [9] and for
even unimodular lattices, both secrecy gains for a special
class of lattices called extremal lattices were computed and
the asymptotic behavior of the average secrecy gain as a
function of the dimension n was investigated. These two
papers were further developed in [10], where coding examples
were detailed and it was shown that as n grows to infinity,
all even unimodular lattices behave in the same way, so that
optimizing the secrecy gain makes sense in small dimensions.
The work of [9], [10] deals with even unimodular lattices,
which only exist in dimensions a multiple of 8. We pursue the
study of unimodular lattices by considering odd unimodular
lattices, which on the contrary exist in every dimension and
in great number, giving thus more flexibility in the code
design. We will also show examples of odd unimodular lattices
outperforming even unimodular lattices. Our contributions can
be summarized as follows:
• We develop a general formula for the secrecy gain of
both odd and even unimodular lattices that generalizes
the existing one for even unimodular lattices.
• We obtain the secrecy gain of unimodular lattices in
dimension n, 8 < n ≤ 23, covering the 4 extremal odd
unimodular lattices as well as all the 111 non-extremal
unimodular lattices.
• We classify the best Gaussian wiretap codes from uni-
modular lattices in dimension n, 8 < n ≤ 23, together
with their corresponding self-dual codes enabling lattice
encoding via Construction A.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we first give a brief introduction to unimodular
lattices and their theta series as well as recall the definition of
the secrecy gain and the previous results concerning this lattice
invariant. The main results are given in Section III. An explicit
formula for the secrecy gain of unimodular lattices is derived,
which generalizes the one for the even case in [10]. Secrecy
gains of extremal odd unimodular lattices are computed to
complete the study of extremal unimodular lattices. Finally, se-
crecy gains of unimodular lattices in dimension 16 ≤ n ≤ 23,
both odd and even, are computed, ending the classification of
unimodular wiretap lattice codes in dimension n, 8 < n ≤ 23.
In Section IV, encoding of the best codes via Construction A
is discussed.
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II. PRELIMINARIES AND PREVIOUS RESULTS
Consider a Gaussian wiretap channel, which is modeled
as follows: Alice wants to send data to Bob on a Gaussian
channel whose noise variance is given by σ2b . Eve is the
eavesdropper trying to intercept data through another Gaussian
channel with noise variance σ2e , where σ2b < σ2e , in order to
have a positive secrecy capacity [6]. More precisely, the model
is
y = x+ vb
z = x+ ve,
(1)
where x is the transmitted signal, vb and ve denote the
Gaussian noise vectors at Bob’s, respectively Eve’s side, each
component of both vectors with zero mean, and respective
variance σ2b and σ2e , and finally y and z are the received signals
at Bob’s, respectively Eve’s side. In this paper, we choose x
to be a codeword coming from a specially designed lattice
of dimension n, namely, we consider lattice coding. Let us
thus start by recalling some concepts concerning lattices, in
particular, unimodular lattices.
A. Unimodular lattices
A lattice Λ is a discrete set of points in Rn, which can be
described in terms of its generator matrix M by
Λ = {x = uM |u ∈ Zn},
where
M =


v11 v12 · · · v1n
v21 v22 · · · v2n
· · · · · ·
vn1 vn2 · · · vnn


and the row vectors vi = (vi1, · · · , vin), i = 1, 2, · · · , n
form a basis of the lattice. The matrix
A =MMT ,
where MT denotes the transpose of M , is called the Gram
matrix of the lattice. It is easy to see that the (i,j)th entry of
A is the inner product of the ith and jth row vectors of M ,
denoted by
A(i,j) = vi · vj .
A lattice Λ is called an integral lattice if its Gram matrix
is an integral matrix. The determinant detΛ of a lattice Λ is
the determinant of the matrix A, which is independent of the
choice of the matrix M . A fundamental region for a lattice
is a building block which when repeated many times fills the
whole space with just one lattice point in each copy. There are
many different ways of choosing a fundamental region for a
lattice Λ, but the volume of the fundamental region is uniquely
determined by Λ and called the volume of Λ, which is exactly√
detΛ. Let us see an example of a fundamental region of a
lattice. A Voronoi cell VΛ(x) of a lattice point x in Λ consists
of the points in the space that are closer to x than to any other
lattice points of Λ.
The dual of a lattice Λ of dimension n is defined to be
Λ∗ = {x ∈ Rn : x · λ ∈ Z, λ ∈ Λ}.
It can be shown that Λ is an integral lattice if and only if Λ ⊂
Λ∗. Especially, if Λ = Λ∗ then Λ is called a unimodular lattice.
It can further be shown that Λ is a unimodular lattice if and
only if Λ is integral and det Λ = 1. Finally, the norm (squared
length) ||x||2 = x·x of a lattice point x in a unimodular lattice
Λ is of course an integer. If the norm is an even integer for any
lattice point in Λ, then Λ is called an even unimodular lattice
or a type II lattice. Otherwise, it is called an odd unimodular
lattice or a type I lattice.
There are certain lattices which play the role of building
blocks in analyzing lattices. They are denoted by An, Dn,
E6, E7, E8 and are called irreducible root lattices [11].
Unimodular lattices are then decomposed into a number of
such lattices. More precisely, an n-dimensional unimodular
lattice Λ is described as one containing a sublattice which is
the direct sum
Λ1 ⊕ Λ2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Λk
of a number of irreducible root lattices of total dimension n,
and consequently a lattice point of Λ can be written as
x = x1 + x2 + · · ·+ xk,
where each component xi is chosen as one of a standard
system of representatives for the cosets of Λi in Λ∗i and called
a glue vector for Λi. Informally speaking, Λ is obtained by
gluing together the components Λ1, Λ2, · · · , Λk by the glue
vectors. The existence of glue vectors will be indicated by “+”
all through this paper. Let us see an example of the simplest
case that is called self-glue.
Example 2.1: We use (rm) to denote a string of m r’s here.
The lattice D+12 = D12 ∪ D12 + (12
12
) contains D12 as a
sublattice and a lattice point of D+12 can be written as x =
x1, x1 ∈ D12 + (012) or x = x1, x1 ∈ D12 + (12
12
), where
the vectors (012) and (12
12
) are the glue vectors for D12.
A complete list of unimodular lattices of dimension n, 0 ≤
n ≤ 23 that contain no vector of norm 1 is given in [12], each
lattice is described by its components. The kissing number of
a lattice (sphere) packing is the number of spheres that touch
one sphere. The kissing numbers of these unimodular lattices
are also given in the same table.
Let us recall the definition of the Jacobi theta functions and
the theta series of lattices before we end this subsection. Let
H = {a+ ib ∈ C|b > 0} denote the upper half plane and let
q = epiiτ , where τ ∈ H.
Definition 2.2: Jacobi theta functions are defined as fol-
lows:
ϑ2(τ) = Σn∈Zq
(n+ 12 )
2
,
ϑ3(τ) = Σn∈Zq
n2 ,
ϑ4(τ) = Σn∈Z(−q)n2 .
They are very important functions in analytic number the-
ory. For example, the discriminant function ∆8(τ) can be
represented by ϑ2(τ) and ϑ4(τ) [12]:
∆8(τ) =
1
16ϑ
4
2(τ)ϑ
4
4(τ)
= 2−8ϑ82(
τ+1
2 )
= q
∏∞
m=1{(1− q2m−1)(1 − q4m)}8
= q − 8q2 + 28q3 − 64q4 + 126q5 + 224q6 + · · · .
(2)
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Definition 2.3: The theta series of a lattice Λ is defined by
ΘΛ(τ) = Σλ∈Λq
λ·λ.
If we combine the terms with the same exponent, the theta
series of an integral lattice Λ can be written as
ΘΛ(τ) = Σ
∞
n=0Anq
n. (3)
By doing that we can interpret the theta series of Λ as a book
keeping device recording the number of vectors λ ∈ Λ with
norm n in the coefficient An. Take the one-dimensional lattice
Z for example and recall the definition of the Jacobi function
ϑ3(τ). We have
ϑ3(τ) = ΘZ(τ) = 1 + 2q
1 + 2q4 + 2q9 + · · · . (4)
Similarily, the theta series of the k-dimensional lattice Zk is
then
ΘZk(τ) = ϑ3(τ)
k. (5)
Theta series of lattices are well studied object in analytic
number theory. Here is a well known result concerning theta
series of unimodular lattices.
Lemma 2.4: (Hecke)[12] If Λ is a unimodular lattice then
ΘΛ(τ) ∈ C[ϑ3(τ),∆8(τ)].
This lemma tells us that the theta series of any unimodular
lattice can be generated by ϑ3(τ) and ∆8(τ). These objects we
have discussed in the last part of this subsection are actually
modular forms. Interested readers may refer to [13] for an
introduction.
B. Previous results
Lattice encoding for the wiretap channel (1) is done via a
generic coset coding strategy [1]: let Λe ⊂ Λb be two nested
lattices. A k-bit message is mapped to a coset in Λb/Λe,
after which a vector is randomly chosen from the coset as the
encoded word. The lattice Λe can be interpreted as introducing
confusion for Eve, while Λb is intended to ensure reliability
for Bob. Since a message is now corresponding to a coset
of codewords instead of one single codeword, the probability
of correct decoding is then summing over the whole coset
(suppose that we do not have power constraint and are utilizing
the whole lattice to do the encoding). Here we are interested
in computing Eve’s probability of correct decision
Pc,e =
∑
t∈Λe
∫
VΛ
b
(x+t)
1
(σe
√
2pi)n
e−||y−x||
2/2σ2
edy.
With a change of variable and applying the Taylor expansion
to the exponential function, the value of Pc,e is approximated
in [10] by
∑
t∈Λe
e−||t||
2/2σ2
e
√
detΛb
(σe
√
2pi)n
(
1− U(VΛb)
2σ2e
√
detΛb
)
,
where
U(VΛb) =
∫
VΛ
b
||x||2du
is the unnormalized second moment of Λb. Since
√
detΛb
and U(VΛb ) are invariants of Λb, to minimize Pc,e is then
to minimize ∑
t∈Λe
e−||t||
2/2σ2
e , (6)
which is easily recognized as the theta series of Λe at τ =
i
2piσ2
e
.
Motivated by the above argument, the confusion brought by
the lattice Λe with respect to no coding (namely, use a scaled
version of the lattice Zn with the same volume) is measured
as follows:
Definition 2.5: [1] Let Λ be an n-dimensional lattice of
volume vn. The secrecy function of Λ is given by
ΞΛ(τ) =
ΘvZn(τ)
ΘΛ(τ)
, τ ∈ H.
The secrecy gain is then the maximal value of the secrecy
function with respect to τ and is denoted by χΛ.
-6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
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Fig. 1. Secrecy function of E8
A large class of lattices was shown to have a symmetry
point (called weak secrecy gain) at τ = i
(detΛ) 1n in their
secrecy function through the Poisson summation formula [10].
For example, Fig. 1 shows the secrecy function ΞE8(τ) of E8,
where 1) we set y = −iτ and restrict to real positive values
of y, since by (6) we are only interested in the values of
ΘE8(τ) with τ = yi, y > 0 and 2) y is plotted in decibels to
transform the multiplicative symmetry point into an additive
symmetry point. The symmetry point can be seen to be y = 0
dB corresponding to y = 1, and hence to τ = i. This class
of lattices contains lattices whose duals are obtained from
themselves by possibly a rotation, reflection, and change of
scale. Let us now focus on unimodular lattices, for which we
have Λ∗ = Λ by definition. It was a conjecture by Belfiore and
Sole´ [9], that for these lattices, τ = i is not only the symmetry
point, but also the point achieving the secrecy gain:
χΛ = ΞΛ(i) =
ϑn3 (i)
ΘΛ(i)
. (7)
This conjecture was recently proven by A.-M. Ernvall-Hyto¨nen
[14], [15] for a special class of lattices called extremal even
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unimodular lattices. The idea of the proof is to write the
secrecy function of a lattice Λ as a function of the quantity
z =
16∆8(τ)
ϑ83(τ)
=
ϑ42(τ)ϑ
4
4(τ)
ϑ83(τ)
, τ ∈ H.
She shows that
z ∈ [0, 1
4
]
and that the maximum 14 of z is achieved at τ = i. The rest
of the proof consists of showing that the function fΛ(z) is
increasing in [0, 14 ]. Later we will prove the conjecture for
extremal odd unimodular lattices as well as unimodular lattices
in small dimensions using this idea.
III. THE SECRECY GAIN OF UNIMODULAR LATTICES
For the sake of convenience, we will assume that the
symmetry point τ = i is really the maximum of the secrecy
function through this section. We will then justify the claim
for the specific lattices we discuss, but note that the general
conjecture is still open.
A. A general formula
We are now ready to give our first result, namely a general
formula for the secrecy gain of unimodular lattices. From
Lemma 2.4 we have the following decomposition of the theta
series of a unimodular lattice Λ:
ΘΛ(τ) =
[n8 ]∑
r=0
arϑ
n−8r
3 (τ)∆
r
8(τ), ar ∈ Z. (8)
Consequently, the reciprocal of the secrecy gain of Λ is
1/χΛ =
ΘΛ(i)
ϑ3(i)n
=
∑[n
8
]
r=0 arϑ
n−8r
3 (i)∆
r
8(i)
ϑn3 (i)
=
∑[n8 ]
r=0 ar(
∆8(i)
ϑ83(i)
)r
=
∑[n8 ]
r=0 ar(
ϑ42(i)ϑ
4
4(i)
16ϑ83(i)
)r
=
∑[n8 ]
r=0 ar(
1
26 )
r,
where the first equality follows from (7), the second from (8),
the fourth from (2), and the final equality from the following
two useful equations concerning the Jacobi theta functions at
τ = i [12]:
ϑ2(i) = ϑ4(i) and ϑ3(i) = 4
√
2ϑ4(i). (9)
To summarize:
Theorem 3.1: The secrecy gain of a unimodular lattice Λ
of dimension n can be written as
χΛ =
1∑[n8 ]
r=0 ar(
1
26 )
r
, (10)
where the ai’s are the coefficients in (8).
This generalizes the formula for the even case in [10].
Fig. 2 gives the plot of the secrecy function of the odd
unimodular lattice D+12 mentioned in Example 2.1 (see the
paragraph following Fig. 1 for an explanation of the variable
y). The maximum can be seen to be 85 , which we will verify
in the next subsection.
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Fig. 2. Secrecy function of D+
12
B. Extremal odd unimodular lattices
In order to find good Gaussian wiretap lattice codes, we
look for unimodular lattices with high secrecy gain. We start
by restricting our search to the class of extremal unimodular
lattices.
Definition 3.2: Let Λ be a lattice of dimension n. Λ is said
to be an extremal lattice if its minimal norm is [n8 ] + 1.
1
By definition, an extremal unimodular lattice Λ of dimen-
sion n contains no vector of norm 1, 2, · · · , [n8 ], thus the
coefficients of q, q2, · · · , q[n8 ] in the theta series given in (3)
are all 0’s. But by expanding (8), we can form another formal
sum with coefficients represented as linear combinations of
ai’s. Then by comparing the first [n8 ] + 1 terms of the two
formal sums, we have a system of [n8 ] linear equations in
[n8 ] unknowns a1, a2, · · · , a[n8 ] (a0 is obviously 1), from
which a unique solution can be found. In this way, the secrecy
gain of each extremal unimodular lattice can be computed. We
illustrate this technique by computing the secrecy gain of D+12
and O23.
Secrecy gain of D+12. The theta series of D+12 looks like
ΘD+12
(τ) = 1 + 0q +A2q
2 + · · · , A2 6= 0.
On the other hand, by (8), (4) and (2),
ΘD+12
(τ) = ϑ123 (τ) + a1ϑ
4
3∆8(τ)
= (1 + 2q + · · · )12 + a1(1 + 2q + · · · )4(q + · · · )
= (1 + 24q + · · · ) + a1(q + · · · )
= 1 + (24 + a1)q + · · · .
We now have one linear equation in one unknown a1
24 + a1 = 0,
which gives a1 = −24, yielding the secrecy gain
χD+12
=
1
1− 2426
=
8
5
. (11)
Secrecy gain of O23. The theta series of the Shorter Leech
Lattice O23 again looks like
ΘO23(τ) = 1 + 0q + 0q
2 +A3q
3 + · · · , A3 6= 0.
1The definition of extremal has changed. Here we use the earlier version.
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TABLE I
SECRECY GAINS OF EXTREMAL ODD UNIMODULAR LATTICES
dim lattice theta series secrecy gain
12 D+
12
ϑ12
3
− 24ϑ4
3
∆8
8
5
14 (E2
7
)+ ϑ14
3
− 28ϑ6
3
∆8
16
9
15 A+
15
ϑ153 − 30ϑ
7
3∆8
32
17
23 O23 ϑ233 − 46ϑ
15
3
∆8
32
9
On the other hand, by (8), (4) and (2)
ΘO23(τ) = ϑ
23
3 (τ) + a1ϑ
15
3 (τ)∆8(τ) + a2ϑ
7
3(τ)∆
2
8(τ)
= (1 + 2q + · · · )23
+a1(1 + 2q + · · · )15(q − 8q2 + · · · )
+a2(1 + 2q + · · · )7(q − 8q2 + · · · )2
= (1 + 46q + 1012q2 + · · · )
+a1(q + 22q
2 + · · · ) + a2(q2 + · · · )
= 1 + (46 + a1)q
+(1012 + 22a1 + a2)q
2 + · · · .
This time, we have two linear equations in a1 and a2{
46 + a1 = 0
1012 + 22a1 + a2 = 0
,
which gives a1 = −46 and a2 = 0, yielding
χO23 =
1
1− 4626
=
32
9
. (12)
By applying this method, we have computed the secrecy
gain for each extremal odd unimodular lattice in dimension
n, n ≥ 10 (see [12] for a classification), as shown in Table I.
A similar table for the even case can be found in [9], [10].
Proposition 3.3: The secrecy conjecture is true, namely, the
maximum of the secrecy function is achieved at τ = i for
extremal odd unimodular lattices and the secrecy gains are
given as in Table I.
Proof. The secrecy gains are computed as illustrated in the
examples of D+12 and O23. Now we only need to show that the
secrecy gains of these unimodular lattices are indeed achieved
at τ = i. Recall the definition of secrecy function and the theta
series of D+12, which we have just computed. We have that
ΞD+12
(τ) =
ϑ123 (τ)
ϑ123 (τ)−24ϑ
4
3(τ)∆8(τ)
= 1
1− 24z16
,
where z = ϑ
4
2(τ)ϑ
4
4(τ)
ϑ83(τ)
. Recall also that it was shown in [14]
that z ∈ [0, 14 ] and 14 is achieved at τ = i. It then suffices
to show that the denominator is decreasing in [0, 14 ], which is
obviously true, since its derivative is negative in [0, 14 ]. Thus
the maximum of the secrecy function is achieved at z = 14 ,
namely, τ = i.
We do the same for the other three extremal odd unimodular
lattices, namely:
Ξ(E27)+(τ) =
ϑ143 (τ)
ϑ143 (τ)−28ϑ
6
3(τ)∆8(τ)
= 1
1− 28z16
,
ΞA+15
(τ) =
ϑ153 (τ)
ϑ153 (τ)−30ϑ
7
3(τ)∆8(τ)
= 1
1− 30z16
,
ΞO23 (τ) =
ϑ233 (τ)
ϑ233 (τ)−46ϑ
15
3 (τ)∆8(τ)
= 1
1− 46z16
.
That the maximum of each secrecy function is achieved at z =
1
4 , namely, τ = i follows similarly. The proof is completed.
A unimodular lattice containing vectors of norm 1 can
always be written as the direct sum of a unimodular lattice
without vectors of norm 1 and a cubic lattice Zk [12]. From
the definition of the secrecy function, we have that the secrecy
gain is determined by the component that contains no vector
of norm 1. In fact,
χΛ⊕Zk =
ϑn3 (i)
ΘΛ(i)ϑk3(i)
=
ϑn−k3 (i)
ΘΛ(i)
= χΛ.
By refering to the enumeration of unimodular lattices [12],
the lattices E8, D+12, (E27)+ and A+15 are the only unimodular
lattices that do not contain vectors of norm 1 in dimensions
less than 16. The secrecy gain of E8 was computed in [9],
[10] and observe that the secrecy gains of these three lattices
are already given in Table I. Thus we in fact have all the best
unimodular lattices in dimension n, 8 < n < 16, namely,
E8 ⊕ Z in dimension 9, E8 ⊕ Z2 in dimension 10, E8 ⊕ Z3
in dimension 11, D+12 in dimension 12, D
+
12⊕Z in dimension
13, (E27)
+ in dimension 14 and A+15 in dimension 15.
We will deal with unimodular lattices in dimension n, 16 ≤
n ≤ 23 in the next subsection.
C. Unimodular lattices in small dimensions
The computation of secrecy gain of extremal unimodular
lattices can easily be adapted to cover a large family of uni-
modular lattices, namely, non-extremal unimodular lattices that
do not contain vectors of norm 1 in dimensions 16 ≤ n ≤ 23.
We show the computation of the secrecy gain of (D28)+ to
illustrate the technique before deriving a general formula of
the secrecy gain for all the 111 lattices and proving the secrecy
conjecture for these lattices.
Secrecy gain of (D28)+. The lattice (D28)+ does not contain
any vector of norm 1. Thus the corresponding coefficient A1
in the theta series is 0. Its kissing number is 224, which means
that the first nonzero coefficient A2 = 224 and the theta series
of (D28)+ looks like
Θ(D28)+(τ) = 1 + 0q + 224q
2 +A3q
3 + · · · . (13)
On the other hand, by (8), (4) and (2),
Θ(D28)+(τ) = ϑ
16
3 (τ) + a1ϑ
8
3(τ)∆8(τ) + a2∆
2
8(τ)
= (1 + 2q + · · · )16
+a1(1 + 2q + · · · )8(q − 8q2 + · · · )
+a2(q − 8q2 + · · · )2
= (1 + 32q + 480q2 + · · · )
+a1(q + 8q
2 + · · · ) + a2(q2 + · · · )
= 1 + (32 + a1)q + (480 + 8a1 + a2)q
2 + · · · .
This time, we have two linear equations in a1 and a2{
32 + a1 = 0
480 + 8a1 + a2 = 224
,
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which gives a1 = −32 and a2 = 0, yielding
χ(D28)+ =
1
1− 3226
= 2. (14)
We now derive a general formula for the secrecy gain of all
the 111 non-extremal unimodular lattices.
Proposition 3.4: The secrecy gain conjecture is true,
namely, the secrecy gain is achieved at τ = i for non-extremal
unimodular lattices in dimension 16 ≤ n ≤ 23 and the secrecy
gain is given by
χΛ =
1
1− 2n26 + 2n(n−23)+K(Λ)212
, (15)
where K(Λ) denotes the kissing number of Λ.
Proof. The theta series of a lattice Λ in question looks like
ΘΛ(τ) = 1 + 0q +K(Λ)q
2 +A3q
3 + · · · . (16)
On the other hand, by (8), (4) and (2)
ΘΛ(τ) = ϑ
n
3 (τ) + a1ϑ
n−8
3 (τ)∆8(τ) + a2ϑ
n−16
3 (τ)∆
2
8(τ)
= (1 + 2q + · · · )n
+a1(1 + 2q + · · · )n−8(q − 8q2 + · · · )
+a2(1 + 2q + · · · )n−16(q − 8q2 + · · · )2
= (1 + 2
(
n
1
)
q + 22
(
n
2
)
q2 + · · · )
+a1(1 + 2
(
n− 8
1
)
q + · · · )(q − 8q2 + · · · )
+a2(q
2 + · · · )
= (1 + 2nq + 2n(n− 1)q2 + · · · )
+a1(q + (2n− 24)q2 + · · · )
+a2(q
2 + · · · )
= 1 + (2n+ a1)q
+(2n(n− 1) + (2n− 24)a1 + a2)q2 + · · · .
Now by comparing the two expressions of ΘΛ, we have two
linear equations in a1 and a2{
2n+ a1 = 0
2n(n− 1) + (2n− 24)a1 + a2 = K(Λ) ,
which gives a1 = −2n and a2 = 2n(n−23)+K(Λ), yielding
from the conjecture
χΛ =
1
1− 2n26 + 2n(n−23)+K(Λ)212
.
We have yet to show that the maximum is indeed achieved
at τ = i. Recalling the definition of secrecy function and the
theta series we have just computed, the secrecy function of Λ
can be written as
ΞΛ(τ) =
ϑn3 (τ)
ϑn3 (τ)−2nϑ
n−8
3 (τ)∆8(τ)+(2n(n−23)+K(Λ))ϑ
n−16
3 (τ)∆
2
8(τ)
= 1
1− 2n16 z+
2n(n−23)+K(Λ)
162
z2
= 1D(z) ,
where D(z) = 1− 2n16 z+ 2n(n−23)+K(Λ)162 z2 and z =
ϑ42(τ)ϑ
4
4(τ)
ϑ83(τ)
.
Recall again that it was shown in [14] that z ∈ [0, 14 ] and 14
is achieved at τ = i. It suffices to show that the denominator
D(z) is decreasing in [0, 14 ]. We now examine the derivative
of the denominator. Note that z ∈ [0, 14 ], 16 ≤ n ≤ 23 and the
largest kissing number for these lattice is 760. Now,
D
′
(z) = −n8 + 2n(n−23)+K(Λ)27 z
≤ −n8 + 2n(n−23)+K(Λ)29
= −64n+2n(n−23)+K(Λ)29
< −1024+0+K(Λ)29
= K(Λ)−102429
≤ 760−102429
< 0.
This tells us that the denominator D(z) is decreasing in [0, 14 ]
and the maximum of the secrecy function is achieved at z = 14 ,
namely, τ = i. The proof is completed.
Table II 2 summarizes the secrecy gains we have computed.
Observe that
1) In dimension 16, the odd unimodular lattice (D28)+
has secrecy gain 2, which outperforms its two even
counterparts (E28)+ and D+16, both with secrecy gain 169 .
2) In fact, when the dimension n is fixed the secrecy gain is
totally determined by the kissing number A2. The lattice
with the best secrecy gain (in boldface) is the one with the
smallest kissing number, which can also be seen directly
from (15). This agrees with the observation in [10] that
the best secrecy gain is achieved by extremal lattices,
for being extremal in this special case is equivalent to
having A2 = 0. We do not know yet if the secrecy gain
is connected to the kissing number in general.
In [10], a lower bound on the minimal secrecy gain as a
function of n from Siegel-Weil formula for even unimodular
lattices was computed. In Fig. 3, the points corresponding to
best unimodular lattices are compared to the bound. Note that
all the points are the secrecy gains of odd lattices, except for
E8 in dimension 8. We observe that when n grows, the gap
between the lower bound and the best lattices decreases, as
suggested in [10], where it was shown that when n increases,
the difference of secrecy gain becomes negligible.
IV. GAUSSIAN WIRETAP CODES FROM UNIMODULAR
LATTICES
As mentioned in Section II, the secrecy gain of a lattice Λ
characterizes the amount of confusion at Eve that is gained
by using this lattice Λ as Λe in the lattice coset code Λe ⊂
Λb. Now that we have established the secrecy gain of all the
unimodular lattices in dimension smaller than 24, we need
to be able to use these lattices, particularly those with the
highest secrecy gain to provide lattice coset codes. To do so,
lattice encoding should be performed, which can be handled
via Construction A, assuming that we can associate to the
chosen lattice a suitable error correction code. We will use
some terminology from classical error correction codes in this
session. Unfamiliar readers can refer to [16].
2Ok in the table denotes an empty component of dimension k, namely, one
containing no vector of norm less than or equal to 2. Also, for the sake of
simplicity, we omit the “+” which denotes the existence of glue vectors.
